Without experience in implementing production sharing agreements, it is difficult, at first glance, to identify the problem, but an analysis of investment errors paints a holistic picture of the patterns.
Production sharing agreements are by their nature long-term, project-based.
Therefore, it is very important to avoid mistakes, as they can be costly.
Production sharing agreements are recorded in tax accounting to separate the investor's costs.
And here the first mistake is born. The company concludes an agreement with itself as a regular company and an investor company and accounts for income and expenses under the production sharing agreement until they are transferred to the agreement.
That is, a kind of "company with a sewn-in agreement" agreement. Unilateral transactions do not create legal consequences. There is a risk of non-recognition of expenses by the state due to a violation of the accounting procedure.
2. The investor's division of tax expenses into refundable and non-refundable portions.
Seeking to maintain financial privileges in a production sharing agreement, investors unknowingly make a mistake.
Works and services that the investor performs on his own and using labor resources are taxed separately, based not on the content of the business transaction, but on the contract of a specific contractor or service provider.
As a rule, the payment of a single social contribution is not included in the compensation costs of investors under employment contracts, but is included in the costs if the investor involves third parties.
The involvement of third parties corresponds to the concept of production sharing agreements, but, within the framework of a production sharing agreement, the independent performance of the scope of work calls into question the compensation of the investor for the single social contribution.
3. Initiating amendments to production sharing agreements regarding the non-application to them of the Procedure and Rules for Compulsory Civil Liability Insurance for Environmental Damage, approved by the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine № 981, dated November 13, 2013
The issue of refusing to apply the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 981 of 13.11.2013 lies in the unwillingness of investors to pay the insurance amount in the amount of 10 million non-taxable minimum incomes of citizens.
Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 981 of 13.11.2013 fixes a large fixed amount of insurance payments, however, the market situation around risk insurance in production sharing agreements is too dynamic, so the threshold will catch up faster than Resolution No. 981.
4. Compensation for a lease agreement concluded for the purposes of a production sharing agreement in respect of premises owned by investors
Costs for staff accommodation are not costs other than hydrocarbon operations. Therefore, rental costs cannot be included in the compensation costs.
5. Accounting for liquidation, restoration, and overhaul of wells.
Investors, conducting tests, receive the total gas flow rate from the wells and begin its construction.
However, economic calculations of construction may indicate the lack of feasibility and geological prospects for further study of carbonates.
Investors take a formal approach to identifying geological exploration operations, rather than a substantive one, since construction work can only be qualified as geological exploration work if it directly relates to the well itself.
The described situation affects the amount of compensation, as the state may not agree to pay.
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