Monday, March 30, 2026

Basics of safe well operation in production sharing agreements

In accordance with the "Rules for the Development of Oil and Gas Fields", approved by Order of the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources No. 118, dated March 15, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), a systematic set of works and research is provided for, which must be carried out for the safe operation and effective maintenance of wells as a whole.

1) a device for sampling wells; 

2) individual measurement of oil, gas and condensate flow; 

3) individual removal of formation, condensation and technical water (echometry, dynamometry, descent of deep instruments, etc.).

Meanwhile, to the provisions of Article 46 of the Law of Ukraine “On Oil and Gas”, the elimination of emergency releases of gas, oil or formation water from a well is carried out by users of oil and gas-bearing subsoil who drill exploratory and production oil and gas wells, as well as develop oil and gas fields and operate underground gas storage facilities.

The Rules provide for the mandatory conduct of capital and routine well work.

Major repairs include work related to: 

1) changing the well operation facility; 

2) attaching loose selectors; 

3) restoring the casing tightness and eliminating its deformation; 

4) drilling the second well; 

5) intensifying the inflow of hydrocarbons; 

6) limiting the inflow of reservoir and injected water; 

7) fishing and other work with underground equipment; 

8) preserving, de-preservation and liquidation of the well.

In turn, current repairs include work that:

1) is related to the transfer of wells from one mode of operation to another;

2) work to ensure the specified technological mode of operation of underground operational equipment;

3) work to replace equipment;

4) clean the wellbore and tubing from sand;

5) сlean paraffin and salts;

6) perform a scheduled inspection of tubing.

Among other things, during well operation, there is a need to inject a corrosion inhibitor into the annulus of the well, before which water samples are taken to determine the content of iron and manganese ions, water density, pH level, etc.

These procedures are carried out for the safe operation and maintenance of wells. 

Failure to carry out these procedures may result in negative environmental, economic and man-made consequences.

Wednesday, March 25, 2026

Who calculates the state share of output in a production sharing agreement?

The distribution of a portion of the extracted hydrocarbons in production sharing agreements is carried out on the basis of distribution acts submitted by the investor.

Use (sale) of part of the produced products that remains in the ownership of the state in accordance with the production sharing agreement (natural gas) in accordance with the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 169.

In turn, the Procedure for the use (sale) of part of the produced products that remain in the ownership of the state, approved by Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 169, does not contain an obligation for investors to prove the price of the produced products.

For its part, the state, as a party to the production sharing agreement, has neither regulation, nor state apparatus, nor methodologies, nor software products for determining the price of produced gas.

Сertainly, the price of "freshly extracted hydrocarbons" is significantly different from the wholesale, transportation or retail price of hydrocarbons.

That is, the state actually fully trusts the gas price formed by investors under production sharing agreements, which affects the size of the state share.

Production sharing agreements contain complex gas price calculation formulas, and the input data for investors is provided by foreign hubs and pipeline operator data.

Ukraine is promoting the idea of ​​​​amending the Procedure for the use (sale) of part of the produced products that remain in the ownership of the state in favor of determining the price of the accounting value of the produced products, since the data of the subsidiary company “Gas of Ukraine” of the joint-stock company “National Joint-Stock Company “Naftogaz of Ukraine” can be used as confirmation of the price for gas.

However, the initiative to amend the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 169 of 02/09/2024 failed, because the subsidiary company “Gas of Ukraine” does not have the financial resources to purchase the necessary calculation according to the gas formula in production sharing agreements.

Thus, the price of extracted hydrocarbons under production sharing agreements is verified based on the indicators of the constituent elements of the gas price formula individually and physically.

Tuesday, March 24, 2026

Top five mistakes of investors in production sharing agreements

Without experience in implementing production sharing agreements, it is difficult, at first glance, to identify the problem, but an analysis of investment errors paints a holistic picture of the patterns.

Production sharing agreements are by their nature long-term, project-based. 

Therefore, it is very important to avoid mistakes, as they can be costly.

Here are the top 5 mistakes investors make in production sharing agreements. Let's take a look.

1. Legal separation of one company into a regular company and an investor company.

Production sharing agreements are recorded in tax accounting to separate the investor's costs.

Production sharing agreements are assigned a special number, which makes it possible to form primary documents and freely move assets.

On the one hand, this is convenient for investors, but in accounting procedures, free movement should be "internally" within the investor's company.

Given that the company's tax accounting as an investor does not change, investors redistribute expenses between "company activities" and "investor activities".

And here the first mistake is born. The company concludes an agreement with itself as a regular company and an investor company and accounts for income and expenses under the production sharing agreement until they are transferred to the agreement. 

That is, a kind of "company with a sewn-in agreement" agreement. Unilateral transactions do not create legal consequences. There is a risk of non-recognition of expenses by the state due to a violation of the accounting procedure.

2. The investor's division of tax expenses into refundable and non-refundable portions.

Seeking to maintain financial privileges in a production sharing agreement, investors unknowingly make a mistake.

Works and services that the investor performs on his own and using labor resources are taxed separately, based not on the content of the business transaction, but on the contract of a specific contractor or service provider.

As a rule, the payment of a single social contribution is not included in the compensation costs of investors under employment contracts, but is included in the costs if the investor involves third parties.

The involvement of third parties corresponds to the concept of production sharing agreements, but, within the framework of a production sharing agreement, the independent performance of the scope of work calls into question the compensation of the investor for the single social contribution.

The desire to save money is turning against investors.

3. Initiating amendments to production sharing agreements regarding the non-application to them of the Procedure and Rules for Compulsory Civil Liability Insurance for Environmental Damage, approved by the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine № 981, dated November 13, 2013

The issue of refusing to apply the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 981 of 13.11.2013 lies in the unwillingness of investors to pay the insurance amount in the amount of 10 million non-taxable minimum incomes of citizens.

Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 981 of 13.11.2013 fixes a large fixed amount of insurance payments, however, the market situation around risk insurance in production sharing agreements is too dynamic, so the threshold will catch up faster than Resolution No. 981.

4. Compensation for a lease agreement concluded for the purposes of a production sharing agreement in respect of premises owned by investors

Costs for staff accommodation are not costs other than hydrocarbon operations. Therefore, rental costs cannot be included in the compensation costs.

5. Accounting for liquidation, restoration, and overhaul of wells.

Investors, conducting tests, receive the total gas flow rate from the wells and begin its construction.

However, economic calculations of construction may indicate the lack of feasibility and geological prospects for further study of carbonates.

Investors take a formal approach to identifying geological exploration operations, rather than a substantive one, since construction work can only be qualified as geological exploration work if it directly relates to the well itself.

The described situation affects the amount of compensation, as the state may not agree to pay.




Thursday, March 19, 2026

On the application of the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine № 169 dated 09.02.2024 "Some issues of the use (sale) of a part of the manufactured products that remain in the ownership of the state in accordance with production sharing agreements

In order to regulate the relationship between the investor, the State Service of the Geology and Mineral Resources of Ukraine, which is the authorized body for the implementation of production sharing agreements, and the subsidiary "Gas of Ukraine" of the joint-stock company "National Joint-stock Company "Naftogaz of Ukraine", which is designated as the authorized person to carry out all actions with hydrocarbons, in the event of the withdrawal of the share of the state of Ukraine in profitable hydrocarbons in kind, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted Resolution No. 169 of 09.02.2024 (hereinafter referred to as Resolution No. 169).

In paragraph one of the Procedure for the use (sale) of part of the produced products that remain in the ownership of the state, approved by Resolution No. 169, it is emphasized that this Procedure determines the relationship between the investor, the State Service of Geology and Mineral Resources, which is the authorized body for the implementation of production sharing agreements, and the subsidiary “Gas of Ukraine” within the framework of the implementation of the concluded agreements on the distribution of hydrocarbons.

That is, the effect of Resolution No. 169 is extended not to one investor, but to all investors in production sharing agreements without exception (regardless of whether they belong to the list of national or foreign), and is intended not for one-time, but for systematic application.

However, Resolution No. 169 contains a special caveat that its effect does not apply only if there are contradictions between the provisions of this Procedure and the agreement concluded between the investor(s) and the state of Ukraine.

According to the explanations of the "Dictionary of the Ukrainian Language" in 11 volumes, prepared by the editorial office of the O.O. Potebnia Institute of Linguistics, the term "contradiction" means: 

1) a situation in which one thing excludes another; 
2) a situation that is incompatible with it; 
3) a situation that is opposite to something; 
4) inconsistency of something with something.

Thus, Regulation No. 169 cannot apply to investors only if the provisions of the production sharing agreement itself: 

1) exclude the application of Regulation No. 169; 
2) Regulation No. 169 is inconsistent with the production sharing agreement; 
3) Regulation No. 169 is inconsistent with certain provisions of the production sharing agreement.

Partial regulation of the procedure for selecting a share in production sharing agreements does not automatically create a contradiction with the provisions of Resolution No. 169. 

The range of possible “contradictions” is not detailed in Resolution No. 169.

Resolution No. 169 in no way contradicts the content of production sharing agreements.

The procedure for using (selling) part of the produced products, although it extends its effect to investors under production sharing agreements, however, according to the explanatory note of the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine, it was developed with the aim of effectively performing its functions in the event of the selection of the share of profitable hydrocarbons due to the state of Ukraine.

Thus, the focus of the regulation of the aforementioned Procedure is focused on aspects of the procedure for selecting the appropriate share for the state of Ukraine, and not on imposing additional obligations on investors under production sharing agreements.

In view of the above, Resolution No. 169 imposes on investors the obligation to exchange information exclusively by providing data to determine the cost, volume of actual gas withdrawals, copies of primary documents confirming investors' expenses that are subject to reimbursement, data on the volume of produced products according to the indicators of measuring equipment, as well as providing copies of acts on the conformity of shares of products and reports verified by an auditor.

In arbitration practice, the principle of rebus sic stantibus is used to determine whether there is an increase in the volume of investors' obligations under production sharing agreements.

The essence of this principle is that additional obligations are assessed taking into account the following: 

1) an extraordinary and unforeseeable event has caused an imbalance in the obligations of the parties; 
2) this imbalance is such that the performance of the production sharing agreement would be unduly burdensome for one of the parties; 
3) the event causing the imbalance must not be the result of an act or omission of the party invoking this principle.

Resolution No. 169 is not an extraordinary and unforeseen event that caused an imbalance in the obligations of the parties under production sharing agreements, is not burdensome for investors in terms of information exchange, and is not a manifestation of inaction on the part of the state.

It is also worth emphasizing that Resolution No. 169 was adopted on 02/09/2024, a date later than the date of entry into force of production sharing agreements, and, therefore, Resolution No. 169 could not fail considering the peculiarities of the selection of shares according to the content of production sharing agreements.

Until the adoption of the Procedure for the Use (Sale) of Part of the Products Remaining in State Ownership, the provisions of production sharing agreements were in effect, however, the mechanism for the use (sale) of part of the products remaining in state ownership came into effect from the adoption of Resolution No. 169.

Monday, March 16, 2026

Investor's share in production sharing agreements and its legal significance

The involvement of a foreign investor in mineral extraction is accompanied by the involvement of a domestic company by determining the "investor's share" in the production sharing agreement.

The participation interest is usually determined as a percentage of the rights and obligations of each investor in a production sharing agreement.

What should be understood by the "investor's participation interest"?

The investor's participation interest is not:

- a way of managing the production sharing agreement;

- is not a mechanism of corporate control;

- is subject to valuation;

- is transferred and assigned at the will of the investor;

- affects the course of the performance of the production sharing agreement.

What is an "investor's share"?

An investor's share is a declaration of an imaginary presumption of equality.

Given that the burden of fulfilling a production sharing agreement falls on the designated investor of the agreement operator, the delegation of rights is transformed into an unconscious transfer to the production sharing operator of investor's ideal share.

It is worth recalling that in the context of the Law of Ukraine "On Production Sharing Agreements" No. 1039-XIV, there is no regulation regarding transactions with investor participation shares in production sharing agreements.

The investor's share of participation is an element of the State's political control over the investor, especially a foreign one, regarding the costs incurred by him, control over the investor regarding the volume of extracted raw materials and minerals, the correctness of accounting and distribution of compensation costs, the rapprochement of national management through the joint participation of two companies with different jurisdictions.

The share of participation is a kind of adaptive element in the implementation of a production sharing agreement.

In our opinion, a foreign investor does not need the participation of a national company through the determination of its share in the participating interests, but should use the service of registering a foreign representative office for the best purposes of implementing a production sharing agreement.

Thursday, March 12, 2026

Chronology and documents for well repair and restoration work in production sharing agreements

The process of repair and restoration works of wells involved in production sharing agreements in Ukraine is as follows:

- development and approval of the calendar plan;

- preparation of design works

a) preparation of design documentation for the development of wells;

b) development of land management documentation;

c) approval of design documents;

d) registration of access to the land plot;

e) making changes to the State Land Cadastre;

f) registration of land rights;

g) conducting soil surveys;

- performance of preparatory works.

The content of the preparatory work is disclosed as follows:

- land reclamation;

- dump formation;

- temporary access road construction;

- site arrangement of prefabricated reinforced concrete slabs;

- mobilization of the underground well repair installation;

- demobilization of the underground well repair installation;

- well connection with the construction of a flare barn;

- reduction of the maintenance site.

Wednesday, March 11, 2026

Permissibility of replacing two-dimensional seismic survey in the Initial Geological Survey Work Program under production sharing agreements

Substitutes for 2D seismic surveying are a key concern for investors under production sharing agreements, as the budget of the Initial Geological Survey Program may exceed the administrative expectations of applicants.

During geological exploration, investors seek to minimize costs by using the data available to investors.

A logical question arises: is it possible to agree to refuse a two-dimensional seismic survey of a subsoil area?

Even with the aim of reducing the costs of the Initial Geological Survey, the refusal to conduct a two-dimensional seismic survey in terms of the implementation of production sharing agreements is an undesirable phenomenon.

Replacing a two-dimensional seismic survey with other data is possible if there are ready-made 2D and 3D materials on the site over an area that is well studied.

However, in practice, it is impossible to work with the data without conducting a two-dimensional seismic survey if drilling an exploration well is planned or it is necessary to confirm the structure to confirm reserves or justify the size of the investments made.

2D seismic exploration is a minimal structural mapping tool prior to drilling.

Omission of 2D seismic increases geological risk.

Exclusion of 2D seismic data from the Initial Commitment reduces the scope of work in the Initial Geological Survey Work Program.

Tuesday, March 10, 2026

Force majeure in the aspect of the legal regime of martial law under production sharing agreements

Typically, in production sharing agreements, the definition of "force majeure" is copied from Part 2 of Article 14-1 of the Law of Ukraine "On Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Ukraine" No. 671/97-VR.

The following norms include force majeure events:

- threat of war;

- armed conflict;

- serious threat of war and armed conflict;

- enemy attacks;

- blockades;

- military embargo;

- mobilization;

- military actions;

- declared or undeclared war;

- riots;

- acts of terrorism;

- sabotage;

- piracy;

- riots;

- revolution;

- mutiny;

- mass riots;

- imposition of curfew;

- quarantine;

- expropriation;

- forced seizure of property;

- seizure of property;

- strike, accident, explosion;

- long interruptions in transport;

- natural and natural disasters.

From the above it follows that the grounds for force majeure do not include the concept of "legal regime of martial law".

Are there any legal risks involved in not including the "martial law" in the texts of production sharing agreements?

The answer is unanimous that no, there are no legal risks involved in not including such wording in the text of production sharing agreements.

Martial law is not imposed without grounds.

Obviously, the grounds for imposing martial law include circumstances that are defined by the Law of Ukraine "On Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Ukraine".

The legal regime of martial law is only an objective form of expression of changed social relations.

Monday, March 9, 2026

Indexation of Costs to be Reimbursed in Production Sharing Agreements

During the implementation of production sharing agreements, investors accumulate costs that the State of Ukraine must reimburse them.

According to the Law of Ukraine "On Production Sharing Agreements", cost indexation is part of the compensation mechanism.

At the same time, the component of the cost indexation mechanism is not regulated by the aforementioned provision.

On the one hand, this is positive, since investors can propose rates or formulas for compensation, but on the other hand, proposals regarding the indexation of compensation significantly change the tax accounting of production sharing agreements.

This sometimes resembles a way to change the Tax Code of Ukraine by amending the production sharing agreement.

It is expected that investors in production sharing agreements will seek to synchronize tax accounting with the accounting of the Investor's expenses, proposing to include the costs of administering taxes and fees in the list of compensation costs through an indexation mechanism.

In production sharing agreements, the amount of taxes and fees is compensated, but their cost of administration is not compensated.

They are covered within the framework of operating and administrative expenses, since their separate separation would entail double compensation by the State.

The proposals for indexing tax expenditures are very dangerous, because there will be:

1) actual accrual of interest on unreimbursed expenses;

2) deferred receipt by the State of the Profit Share in raw materials;

3) double indexation is introduced (interest and exchange rate);

4) establishment of a threshold for the Investor's guaranteed return at the expense of the State.

It is also fair to carry out indexation at the level of consumer prices.

Although the State's threshold for reimbursement will be higher than interbank lending rates, it will eliminate the problem of compensating investors for unregulated expenses for administering the production sharing agreement.

Wednesday, March 4, 2026

What type of well is not found in production sharing agreements?

According to paragraph 51 of the Rules for the Development of Oil and Gas Fields, approved by Order of the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources No. 118 dated March 15, 2007, categories of wells are divided into 3 types:

- exploratory;

- intelligence;

- operational.

The difference in the value of the three wells is very minimal, since production can be fully launched from each of them.

At the same time, in production sharing agreements in Geological Exploration Programs, 2 types of wells are usually used: intelligence and operational.

The emphasis on the above two wells is not accidental, since drilling an exploration well is to confirm the fact of the presence of deposits, obtain the first data about the deposit and pave the way for the confirmation of reserves.

From the beginning of the Initial Geological Survey Work Program, it is presumed that the Investor has independently and at its own expense completed all preparatory work for the implementation of the Initial Geological Survey Work Program.

"Preparatory measures" for drilling should not be incorporated into the Initial Geological Survey Work Program for inclusion in the Costs subject to Compensation, as the latter are covered by the legal regime of the Initial Investor Obligations.

Design of pilot-industrial field development

Based on the approved technological indicators for the field development, project documents are prepared for its development (up to 5 years)...